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ABSTRACT
Using firm-level data, we document two new facts regarding intrafirm trade and the activities
of the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational corporations. First, intrafirm trade is concentrated
among a small number of large affiliates within large multinational corporations; the median affil-
iate ships nothing to the rest of the corporation. Second, we find that the input-output coefficient
linking the parent’s and affiliate’s industries of operation — a characteristic commonly associated
with production fragmentation — is not related to a corresponding intrafirm flow of goods.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 30 years, the global fragmentation of production grew dramatically, as did the trade
in final and intermediate goods that it entails.1 Multinational corporations (MNC) are at the center
of this phenomenon, as they account for the vast majority of trade across countries. An extensive
literature has developed that studies the international trade that takes place within the multina-
tional corporation as a means to better understand the underlying patterns of production fragmen-
tation.2 We add to this literature by documenting two new sets of facts on the intra-corporation
trade of U.S. multinational corporations.
First, we show that, although intra-MNC trade represents an important fraction of aggregate
U.S. exports and imports, the median manufacturing foreign affiliate ships nothing to — and re-
ceives nothing from — its parent in the United States. Intra-MNC trade is concentrated in a small
group of large affiliates and large corporations: The largest five percent of affiliates accounts for
around half of the total trade to and from the parent, while the largest five percent of corporations
accounts for almost two thirds of total intra-MNC trade. This skewness is also observed within
the corporation: Intra-MNC trade tends to be concentrated in a small number of an MNC’s largest
foreign affiliates.
The lack of intra-MNC cross-border trade that we find for foreign affiliates of U.S. multina-
tionals is more surprising than the similar finding in Atalay et al. (2014) for intrafirm trade within
the United States. Factor price differences — the theoretical motivation for vertical fragmenta-
tion and the intrafirm trade that accompanies it — are much larger across countries than across
U.S. cities. In this regard, Brainard (1993) first documented the weak relationship between factor
endowments and intra-MNC trade across borders.
The skewness of intra-MNC trade towards large affiliates and corporations in our first finding
is reminiscent of the skewness in the distributions of other international activities. Manufacturing
exports are concentrated in large firms (Bernard and Jensen, 1995), and even larger firms own for-
eign affiliates (Helpman et al., 2004). These patterns are consistent with theories of the firm that
are based on economies of scale in production. In Grossman et al. (2006), for example, the produc-
tion of inputs for the entire multinational corporation is concentrated into a few large affiliates,
1See Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2013) for a recent survey.
2Working at the affiliate level, for example, Borga and Zeile (2004), Hanson et al. (2005), Feinberg and Keane (2006),
and Bilir et al. (2013) analyze the country- and industry-level determinants of intra-MNC trade. Carr et al. (2001), Antras
(2003), Yeaple (2006), Nunn and Trefler (2008), Bernard et al. (2009), and Costinot et al. (2011) analyze intra-MNC trade
using data aggregated to the country-industry level.
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which exploit the strong economies of scale in production. Affiliates created to supply a foreign
market — as an alternative to exporting, in order to avoid transportation costs — are relatively
small. The model predicts that a small number of large affiliates ship goods within the corpora-
tion, while numerous smaller affiliates serve local markets. The concentration of intra-MNC trade
in the largest firms is also consistent with the contract theory of the multinational firm proposed
by Antras and Helpman (2004): In their framework with heterogeneous firms, only the largest
firms choose to integrate offshore activities.
Our second set of facts relates intra-MNC trade to the upstream and downstream links between
the industries of the parent and affiliate, as defined by the U.S. input-output table. As previously
shown in Alfaro and Charlton (2009), we find that multinational corporations own affiliates in
industries that are vertically linked to the parent’s industry. The input-output coefficient between
the affiliate’s and the parent’s industries of operation, however, is not related to the existence and
the magnitude of the trade in goods between the two. These findings are similar to those in Atalay
et al. (2014), who study multi-establishment firms within the United States: The ownership of
vertically linked affiliates is not related to the transfer of goods within the boundaries of the firm.
Our analysis is made possible by U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data, in which
each affiliate’s sales are broken down by destination (the United States, the host country, or a
third country) and by transaction type (the parent, another affiliate, or an unaffiliated party). The
richness of the data allows us to identify production chains inside the boundaries of the MNC,
but the data are unable to capture a vertical production chain once the intermediate goods leave
the multinational corporation. We cannot capture, for example, MNC configurations that involve
unrelated parties in some stages of production interacting with different affiliates of the same firm,
possibly in different countries and industries. While the data have limitations, the BEA benchmark
surveys offer the most complete description of multinational activity available, allowing us to
characterize, in depth, several aspects of these global production chains.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the data and
broad patterns of intra-MNC trade, and section 4 analyzes the relationship between input-output
links and intra-MNC trade. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Data
Our firm-level data are collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis for the purpose of
producing aggregate statistics on the operations of multinational companies.3 These data cover
the universe of U.S. parents and their foreign affiliates in the benchmark year 2004.
Our sample consists of the majority-owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs: affiliates with parents
that own more than 50 percent of the affiliate’s voting stock or equivalent), that have sales, assets,
or net income (loss) of more than $25 million, and that operate — and are owned by a parent that
operates — in a manufacturing industry. The 4,901 affiliates in our MOFA25 sample account for
almost 80 percent of total reported affiliate sales, 90 percent of total reported affiliate sales to the
parent, and almost 80 percent of total reported parent exports to affiliates.
Two features of the BEA data, only available for the MOFA25 sample of affiliates, make our
analysis possible. The first is a classification of affiliate sales broken down by transaction type.
In the data, an affiliate’s sales can be directed to: (i) the parent; (ii) unaffiliated U.S. parties; (iii)
local affiliates; (iv) local unaffiliated parties; (v) affiliated parties in neither the U.S. nor the host
country (what we call third countries); and (vi) unaffiliated parties in third countries. These af-
filiates also report shipments received from their parents.4 The second feature of the data is a
breakdown of parents’ and affiliates’ sales in each of their seven largest industries, as classified
by the International Surveys Industry (ISI) classification, which is roughly equivalent to the 2002
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). We focus our baseline analysis on the
affiliate’s and parent’s primary industries of operation, which are typically the industries with the
largest shares of total sales.5 There are 77 four-digit manufacturing industries in the the ISI classi-
fication. In our sample, affiliates are present in all 77 industries and parent firms are present in 74
industries.
Further details regarding the data and the sample construction are in online appendix A.
3The other source of U.S. affiliated-party trade data is the U.S. Census Bureau’s related-party trade database, which
is based on transaction-level data at the country-industry level. Ruhl (2015) shows that the two datasets are broadly
consistent at the aggregate level.
4Both shipments from and to the parent refer to all goods. The sub-sample of affiliates with sales, assets, or net
income (loss) of more than $150 millions (MOFA150) has to report shipments from the parent broken down by goods
for resale and goods for further processing or assembly. As table A1 in the appendix shows, goods for processing
accounts for more than 85 percent of the total goods shipped to the affiliate by the parent. A similar break-down by
type of good is not available for shipments from the affiliate to the parent.
5The median foreign affiliate operates in only one four-digit manufacturing industry, and the employment-weighted
average share of its total sales accounted for by the primary industry is 0.92. The median parent operates in two
industries, and the employment-weighted average share of its total sales accounted for by the primary industry is 0.74.
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3 Patterns of Intra-MNC Trade
In our data, intra-MNC trade makes up the majority of affiliate exports: 70 percent of total affiliate
sales made outside of the host country were directed to other affiliates within the corporation.
This aggregate statistic, however, masks substantial heterogeneity across affiliates.
3.1 The Skewness of Intra-MNC Trade
Panel 1 in table 1 shows that while, on average, 27 percent of an affiliate’s sales are to other parties
within the corporation and seven percent are to the parent (column 1), the median affiliate reports
only nine percent of its sales to be intra-MNC and reports no trade with its parent (column 3).6
The corollary is that the majority of affiliates sell their output to unaffiliated parties: The median
affiliate’s shipments to unaffiliated parties accounts for 91 percent of its sales and consists mainly
of sales in its country of operation (column 3). These statistics point to a very skewed distribution
of the share of intra-MNC trade across affiliates: As column 5 shows, a small group of affiliates
in the 95th percentile are devoted exclusively to shipping within the corporation, and an even
smaller group engages in trade only with their parents.
In panel 2, we report shipments of goods from the parent to the foreign affiliate, as a share
of the affiliate’s total cost of goods sold (cogs). The median affiliate receives nothing from its
parent (column 3), while affiliates in the 95th percentile receive 38 percent of their inputs from
their parents (column 5), indicating that only a handful of affiliates receive most of their inputs
from their parents.7
In panel 3, rather than focusing on the affiliate as the unit of analysis, we aggregate the data to
the corporation level to see — in an admittedly simple way — how intra-MNC trade varies across
MNCs. For each MNC, we construct MNC-wide sales and intra-MNC sales by aggregating total
sales and total shipments to related parties, respectively, of each foreign affiliate and the parent.
The patterns found for individual affiliates in panel 1 are also present at the corporation level: For
the median corporation, intra-MNC sales account for six percent of total sales (column 3).
Figure 1 further describes the distribution of the share of intra-MNC trade in affiliate sales
6Note that the median affiliate changes as we change the sorting variable. From now on, we refer to “the median
affiliate” with the understanding that it is the median affiliate with respect to the variable being studied.
7The group of affiliates located in the North American motor vehicles sector is often held up as an example of the
importance of intrafirm trade. Indeed, the median shares of intra-MNC sales for this group are the highest across all
industry and country groups (30, 18, and 2 percent for trade to all affiliated parties, to the parent, and from the parent,
respectively — not shown). Even so, more than 50 percent of affiliates in this group sell more than 95 percent of their
output to unaffiliated parties, while almost 10 percent of them direct more than 95 percent of their sales to affiliated
parties (not shown).
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across affiliates. Figure 1a shows the distribution of affiliates by their shares of sales to the parent
and their shares of cogs received from their parents. Almost 80 percent of affiliates direct less than
five percent of their sales to the parent — and receive a similar share of goods from it. Figure 1b
shows the distribution of intra-MNC trade shares: About 55 percent of affiliates — and almost 70
percent of MNCs — sell less than ten percent of their output to affiliated parties, while about 10
percent of affiliates are almost exclusively dedicated to supplying other parties in the corporation.
The skewness of intra-MNC trade toward a few affiliates and a few corporations is clearly
shown in figure 2: Five percent of affiliates account for 88 percent of affiliate-to-parent trade,
82 percent of parent-to-affiliate trade, and 75 percent of affiliate trade to other affiliates. In the
opposite tail of the distribution, 50 percent of affiliates ship nothing to — and receive nothing from
— their parents, while almost 25 percent ship nothing to any related party. The concentration is
markedly less dramatic when we look at the corporation level. The five percent of corporations
with the largest intra-MNC trade flows account for 23 percent of total intra-MNC trade, while the
bottom 50 percent account for 9 percent of total intra-MNC trade.
Tables B1 and B2 in online appendix B report statistics by sector and geographic region.
3.2 The Role of Firm Size
We have documented that intra-MNC trade is concentrated in a small group of affiliates and cor-
porations. Here, we explore the characteristics of those firms. In particular, we focus on the
relationship between affiliate and corporation size and the presence and magnitude of intra-MNC
sales. Columns 6–8 in table 1 report the average share of affiliate sales by destination for firms that
are above the 50th, 75th, and 95th percentile of the employment size distribution. The average
share of affiliate output sold within the corporation increases from 27 percent for the full sample
to 36 percent for the firms above the 95th size percentile (columns 1 and 8 in panel 1). This largest
five percent of affiliates accounts for 40 percent of all trade to affiliated parties and for about half
of all shipments made to and from parents (not shown). A similar pattern, though with smaller
quantitative differences, describes the importance of intra-MNC trade when aggregating to the
MNC-wide level (columns 1 and 8 in panel 3). The largest five percent of corporations accounts
for almost two thirds of total intra-MNC trade (not shown).
Next, we explore the relationship between firm size and intra-MNC trade more formally by
analyzing the presence and magnitude of intra-MNC trade across affiliates and MNCs, while con-
trolling for affiliate-industry and destination-country fixed effects, as well as MNC characteristics.
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We estimate, by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS),
D(Xij) = β log empa + Zc + Fd + Fx + εij , (1)
log(Xij) = γ log empa + Zc + Fd + Fx + εij . (2)
In (1), the dependent variable, D(Xij), equals one if the corresponding intra-MNC trade flow is
positive and zero otherwise. The specification in (2) considers only those affiliates with positive
intrafirm trade. We analyze four types of intra-MNC trade: (i) for ij = ap, shipments from the
affiliate to the parent as a share of the affiliate’s total sales (Xap); (ii) for ij = ac, shipments from
the affiliate to any affiliated party as a share of the affiliate’s total sales (Xac); (iii) for ij = pa,
shipments from the parent to the affiliate as a share of the affiliate’s cogs (Xpa); and (iv) for ij = cc,
intra-MNC trade as a share of the MNC’s total sales (Xcc).
The key regressor in both specifications is affiliate size, as measured by employment (empa).
The variable Zc is a vector of MNC characteristics (size of the parent, log empp; size of the corpo-
ration, log empc; and the number of foreign affiliates in the corporation, logNc). We also include
affiliate industry and affiliate destination country fixed effects, Fx and Fd, respectively. In some
specifications, we replace the vector Zc with an MNC fixed effect.
Table 2 reports the results. Larger affiliates are substantially more likely to ship goods to —
and from — the parent and to related parties (columns 1, 5, and 9). This result holds when we
include corporation fixed effects: The largest affiliates in the corporation are more likely to trade
within it (columns 2, 6, and 10). The intensive margin also increases with the affiliate’s size when
we consider flows from the affiliate to the parent: For larger affiliates, shipments to the parent
represent a larger fraction of their sales. When shipments from the parent to the affiliate are con-
sidered (column 11), their share in the cost of goods sold by the affiliate decreases with the affiliate
size and increases with the parent’s size. Within the same MNC, smaller affiliates are also the ones
for which goods shipped from the parent represent a larger share of the costs of goods sold (col-
umn 12). Finally, larger MNCs, in terms of number of foreign affiliates, have a higher likelihood
(column 13) and higher share (column 14) of intra-MNC trade in total sales, and larger MNCs, in
terms of employment, also have larger intra-MNC shares of sales. Even though larger corpora-
tions are typically headed by a larger parent firm, once we account for the size of the corporation,
in terms of both the number of affiliates and aggregate employment, the size of the parent firm, in
terms of employment, decreases the share of intra-MNC trade in total corporation sales.
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4 Input-Output Links and Intra-MNC Trade
In the existing literature, country and industry characteristics have been used to explain the ob-
served patterns of intra-MNC trade. Our focus, in contrast, is on variables that characterize the
parent-affiliate pair and determine the potential for trade between the two, after controlling for
country- and industry-level characteristics. Specifically, we are interested in what the input-output
relationship between the parent’s industry and the affiliate’s industry can tell us about the pres-
ence and magnitude of intra-MNC trade.
We begin by characterizing the input-output relationship between the affiliate’s and parent’s
industries using the direct requirements coefficients from the 2002 U.S. input-output (I-O) table,
which reflects the observed inter-industry trade pattern in the United States.8,9 An observation
in the I-O table is a commodity-industry pair, and the direct requirements coefficient, drij , is the
value of inputs from industry i needed to produce one dollar of output in industry j. We map the
commodity and industry classification used in the I-O table into the NAICS-based ISI classification
used by the BEA, yielding 77 manufacturing industries.
The classical theory on the boundaries of the firm would predict that our measure — by indi-
cating the existence of an affiliate (parent) in an industry that produces goods used as inputs by
the parent’s (affiliate’s) industry — should signal the existence of shipments of goods between the
affiliate to the parent.10 Here, having data on both the affiliate’s and parent’s industries and on
intra-MNC trade, we can test whether the purpose of owning I-O linked affiliates is the transfer
of goods within the firm. Our data allow us to observe only firm characteristics for trade between
parents and affiliates, so we restrict our analysis to these transactions.
In figure 3a, we summarize the characteristics of the direct requirements table, and in figure 3b,
we plot the distribution of industry pairs for the parent-affiliate pairs in our data. The x-axis in
figure 3a is the ISI code of the using (downstream) industry, and the y-axis is the ISI code of the
producing (upstream) industry. In figure 3a, the bubble’s size is proportional to the size of the
direct requirements coefficient of the industry pair. In figure 3b, the bubble’s size is proportional
to the number of parent-affiliate observations in that industry pair. It is clear from figure 3a that
8Papers that use the I-O table to construct a proxy for vertical production fragmentation between two firms in
different countries are, among others, Acemoglu et al. (2009), Alfaro and Charlton (2009), and Fajgelbaum et al. (2014).
9While Antras et al. (2012) construct a measure of “upstreamness” that characterizes an industry’s position along the
entire production chain, our goal is to characterize the amount of trade we would expect to see between two industries
— a task for which the direct requirements coefficient is the relevant measure.
10This is the assumption underlying the findings in Alfaro and Charlton (2009), who use the presence of I-O links to
infer vertical FDI (defined as “subsidiaries which provide inputs to their parent firms”), and Fajgelbaum et al. (2014),
who use these links to distinguish between vertical and horizontal affiliates.
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most industries require inputs from similar industries: The entries in the direct requirements table
tend to be largest on or near the diagonal.
Combining figures 3a and 3b suggests that parents own affiliates in similar industries, and
these industries are important producers of intermediate inputs for each other. In fact, more than
90 percent of the manufacturing affiliates operate in an industry with a positive direct requirement
coefficient with the parent’s industry — what we call an Input-Output (I-O) link.11 We further
explore this relationship by estimating (OLS)
D(Nxzd) = βUdrxz + βDdrzx + Fxd + εxzd (3)
log(Nxzd) = αU log drxz + αD log drzx + Fxd + εxzd. (4)
Let x be the primary industry of the affiliate, z be the primary industry of the parent, and d be the
affiliate host country. We aggregate the firm-level data so that the unit of observation is a triplet,
xzd, that refers to the affiliate’s primary industry, the parent’s primary industry, and the affiliate’s
country of operation. Nxzd is the number of affiliates in the triplet, and D(Nxzd) is equal to one
if we observe at least one affiliate in the triplet xzd and zero otherwise. Fxd are affiliate industry-
destination country fixed effects. We report the estimates of (3) and (4) in columns 1 and 2 of
table 3. Consistent with Alfaro and Charlton (2009), the direct requirements coefficients are sig-
nificant predictors of multinational investment. For example, a 10-percent increase in both the
upstream and downstream average direct requirements coefficients implies a 90-percent increase
in the probability of observing FDI activity in an xzd triplet. The impact of the direct requirements
coefficients on the number of affiliates in xzd triplets with positive observations can also be ob-
served in the adjusted variable plots in figures 4a and 4b. The affiliate industry-destination fixed
effects explain most of the variation in the number of observations, but there is still a clear pos-
itive relationship between (the residuals of) the number of affiliates and the direct requirements
coefficients between a parent’s and its affiliate’s primary industries.
Even though multinational corporations own affiliates that operate in industries with strong
I-O links to their parents’ industries, we are left with the question: Are input-output links associ-
ated with trade in goods between the parent and affiliate? We explore this question formally by
11The average direct requirements coefficient in the I-O table is 0.005, and 49 percent of the industry pairs have a
direct requirements coefficient equal to zero. In the parent-affiliate data, however, the average direct requirements
coefficient jumps to 0.072 when we consider the parent to be upstream, and 0.069 when we consider the affiliate to
be upstream. The share of parent-affiliate industry pairs whose direct requirements coefficient is zero is less than ten
percent.
8
estimating (OLS)
D(Xap) = βdrxz + Fd + Fx + εxz, (5)
log(Xap) = α log drxz + Fd + Fx + εxz. (6)
The variable Xap is shipments from affiliate a to parent p, as a share of total affiliate sales, and
D(Xap) equals one ifXap > 0 and zero otherwise. Note that the direct requirements coefficient has
the affiliate’s industry in the upstream position. Fd and Fx are affiliate-industry and destination-
country fixed effects, and in some specifications, we also include MNC fixed effects. We estimate
an analogous set of equations for shipments from the parent to the affiliate, as a share of the
affiliate’s cogs, Xpa, using the direct requirement coefficient with the affiliate’s industry in the
downstream position, drzx. Note that the linear probability model provides a check that transfer
pricing is not driving our results. Any measure of intra-MNC trade may be contaminated by the
non-market prices used to value within-firm transactions. The concern is that if transfer prices are
biased downward, this could bias our estimates of the intensive margin towards zero. The linear
probability model avoids this issue since it is unlikely that a firm with positive intra-MNC trade
could report zero trade.
We report the estimates from (5) and (6) in columns 3–10 in table 3. The coefficients on drxz
and drzx are insignificant: The I-O link between the parent’s and the affiliate’s industries are not
informative about the existence and the magnitude of shipments between the affiliate and the
parent.
Figures 4c and 4d report the adjusted variable plots for parent-affiliate trade and the corre-
sponding direct requirements coefficient. Compared to the plots in figures 4a and 4b, the fixed
effects explain less of the parent-affiliate trade variation, and there is no relationship between the
magnitude of the trade flow between the affiliate and the parent and the corresponding I-O link
between the two firms’ industries of operation.
To summarize, we find that multinational corporations tend to own affiliates that operate in
industries downstream or upstream of the parent firm’s industry; however, I-O links between
parents’ and affiliates’ industries do not predict the existence and magnitude of trade between the
two. These results lead to the obvious question: Why do multinationals own affiliates in indus-
tries downstream or upstream of those of the parent, if not for the shipment of goods along the
vertical production chain? Atalay et al. (2014), who find similar results when studying the flow of
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goods between related establishments in the United States, suggest that the firm’s boundaries are
determined by the transfer of capabilities and not by the transfer of goods. Strong input-output
links between two industries may signal the use of a common set of intangible inputs, knowl-
edge, and expertise; this may be the case internationally, as well. Sharing these intangibles can
be an advantage in the production of I-O linked goods, even in the absence of physical shipments
between affiliates. In the international trade and multinational firm literature, this commonly re-
quired knowledge has been formalized as the capacity to solve related problems, as in Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006); the stock of technology capital — specific to goods of similar charac-
teristics — as in McGrattan and Prescott (2010); managerial ability, as in Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007); core capabilities, as in Bernard et al. (2011); and the stock of knowledge capital that is
a public good within the corporation, as in the seminal work of Markusen (1984). If this is the
case, the multinational corporation may have comparative advantages in producing goods that
are linked by I-O relationships without any trade in goods within its boundaries.
4.1 Robustness
We now present two robustness tests of our results in table 3 — that I-O links between a parent’s
and an affiliate’s industries do not predict the existence and the importance of trade between the
two.12
Off-Diagonal Industry Pairs. Industries are very heterogeneous in the direct requirements co-
efficient with itself, possibly reflecting I-O links between sub-industries. Affiliates and parents
operating in the same ISI code could be producing an input for a downstream sub-industry that
we do not observe due to the coarseness of the industry classification.
To confirm that our results are not driven by same-industry pairs, we estimate (5) and (6)
including the interaction between the direct requirements coefficient and a dummy variable that
equals one for observations in which the affiliate and the parent operate in the same (primary)
industry, and equals zero otherwise. The robustness specification also tests whether trade between
a parent and an affiliate operating in the same industry is larger for an industry with a larger
direct requirements coefficient with itself. The coefficient on the interaction term represents this
possibility.
Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 in table 4 report the estimates of the augmented regression. The proba-
12We have also checked the robustness of our results to the coarseness of the industry classification, a discrete clas-
sification of I-O links as in Alfaro and Charlton (2009), and the sub-sample of large majority-owned affiliates with
sales, assets, or net income (loss) of more than $150 million (available upon request). The lack of a positive, significant
relationship between I-O links and shipments between the parent and the affiliate survives.
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bility of observing intra-MNC trade increases for parent and affiliate pairs operating in the same
industry (columns 1 and 5). Again, we find that the I-O link between the parent and the affiliate
is not a significant predictor of trade between the affiliate and the parent, neither on nor off the
diagonal of the I-O table.
Alternative Measures of I-O Links. Our baseline I-O link measure is the direct requirements
coefficient between the primary industries of the parent and the affiliate. As an alternative, we
construct a measure of the I-O link between the parent and the affiliate that includes each party’s
seven most important industries of operation. We restrict the analysis to all four-digit industries
in the manufacturing sector to compute a sales-weighted average of the direct requirements co-
efficients of all the possible combinations of parent and affiliate industries. Let P be the set of
industries in which the parent operates, and let A be the set of industries in which the affiliate
operates. Our new measure of the I-O link between the industries of the affiliate and of the parent,
vap and vpa, are:
vap ≡
∑
x∈A,z∈P drxz × saleszp
total salesa
vpa ≡
∑
x∈A,z∈P drzx × salesza
total salesp
, (7)
where salesza (saleszp) is the affiliate’s (parent’s) sales in industry z. Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 in table 4
report the estimates of (5) and (6) using these alternative measures of I-O links. The patterns found
using this more comprehensive measure are the same as the ones observed in table 3.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented two sets of facts related to the cross-country fragmentation of production
within the boundaries of the corporation. First, we find that intra-MNC trade in goods is not the
typical activity of the median affiliate of U.S. multinationals; rather, within-firm trade is concen-
trated in the largest affiliates of MNCs. Second, the input-output relationship between the parent’s
and the affiliate’s operating industries, a commonly used measure for vertical fragmentation, is
not associated with the presence and magnitude of intra-MNC trade.
Our finding that there is little cross-country fragmentation of the production chain within the
boundaries of the corporation raises a new set of questions to be explored in future research.
For example, how do multinational corporations use third-party suppliers? To what extent do
these third-party suppliers interact with different parts of the same corporation? The challenge
in answering these new questions is the need for even more detailed data on the activities of the
multinational corporation.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Distribution of affiliates and MNCs by share of sales to affiliated parties.
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Notes: In panel a, observations are at the affiliate level. In panel b, intra-MNC shipments is the sum over all of the
foreign affiliates and the parent of the MNC, and shipments to all affiliated parties is total shipments from an affiliate
to other parties in the MNC.
Figure 2: Distribution of intra-MNC trade across affiliates and MNCs.
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Notes: In panel a, observations are at the affiliate level. In panel b, intra-MNC shipments is the sum over all of the
foreign affiliates and the parent of the MNC, and shipments to all affiliated parties is total shipments from an affiliate
to other parties in the MNC. In panel (a), the 55th percentile is the first non-zero entry for both parent-to-affiliate and
affiliate-to-parent trade. In panel (b), the 25th (10th) percentile is the first non-zero entry for affiliate-affiliated-party
(intra-MNC) trade.
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Figure 3: Direct requirements coefficients and parent-affiliate activity.
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Left Panel: Direct requirements coefficients for industry pairs in 2002; bubbles are proportional to the size of the di-
rect requirements coefficient. The direct requirements coefficient is the value of goods needed from the producing
(upstream) industry in order to produce one dollar of output in the using (downstream) industry. Manufacturing in-
dustries only (ISI codes 3111–3399). Right Panel: Frequency of the (primary) industries of parent-affiliate pairs; bubbles
are proportional to the number of parent-affiliate pairs in a given industry pair.
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Figure 4: Adjusted variable plots for I-O links, multinational activity, and intra-MNC trade.
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Notes: Panel a plots the residuals of log(Nxzd) and drxz , after projecting them onto the affiliate industry-destination
fixed effects and drzx. Panel b plots the residuals of log(Nxzd) and drzx, after projecting them onto the affiliate industry-
destination fixed effects and drxz . Panel c plots the residuals of log(Xap) and drxz , after projecting them onto the affiliate
industry-destination fixed effects. Finally, panel d plots the residuals of log(Xpa) and drzx, after projecting them onto
the affiliate industry-destination fixed effects. Nxzd is the number of foreign affiliates in the triplet given by affiliate’s
industry x, parent’s industry z, and destination country d. Xap is affiliate-to-parent trade as a share of affiliate’s sales,
and Xpa is parent-to-affiliate trade as a share of affiliate’s cogs. drxz (resp. drxz) is the direct requirements coefficient
from the affiliate’s (resp. parent’s) primary industry into the production of the parent’s (resp. affiliate’s) primary
industry.
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Table 1: Intra-MNC trade, summary.
mean std p50 p75 p95 emp>p50 emp>p75 emp>p95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel 1: Share of affiliate sales
to any unaffiliated parties 0.73 0.34 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.68 0.64
to local unaffiliated parties 0.57 0.39 0.66 0.97 1.00 0.55 0.54 0.51
to non-local unaffiliated 0.17 0.27 0.00 0.24 0.84 0.15 0.13 0.12
to any affiliated party 0.27 0.34 0.09 0.41 1.00 0.30 0.32 0.36
to parent 0.07 0.19 0.00 0.02 0.49 0.09 0.11 0.14
Panel 2: Share of affiliate cogs
from parent 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.04 0.38 0.05 0.05 0.06
Panel 3: Share of total MNC sales
to any unaffiliated party 0.89 0.13 0.93 0.98 1.00 0.89 0.88 0.86
to any affiliated party 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.31 0.11 0.12 0.16
Notes: Columns 3–5 report the average of the 11 firms around the indicated percentile. Columns 6–8 report the average
values for the firms (or MNCs) with employment greater than the indicated percentile employment. In panel 3, statistics
correspond to the aggregate at the corporate level, which includes the parent and its reporting foreign affiliates.
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Table 2: Intra-MNC trade and firm size.
D(Xap) log(Xap) D(Xac) log(Xac) D(Xpa) log(Xpa) D(Xcc) log(Xcc)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
log empa 0.085
∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.113∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.062) (0.078) (0.007) (0.007) (0.037) (0.043) (0.008) (0.008) (0.045) (0.058)
log empp −0.017 −0.033 −0.026 −0.106 0.007 0.505∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.919∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.179) (0.039) (0.169) (0.048) (0.172) (0.023) (0.183)
logNc 0.011 −0.217∗ 0.064∗∗∗ −0.091 0.007 −0.120 0.069∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.112) (0.020) (0.106) (0.026) (0.093) (0.013) (0.095)
log empc −0.027 0.088 −0.027 0.242 −0.068 −0.442∗ −0.018 0.560∗∗
(0.051) (0.234) (0.051) (0.214) (0.060) (0.215) (0.027) (0.223)
Aff industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Aff country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
MNC FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No No
Observations 4,731 4,738 2,176 2,177 4,731 4,738 3,673 3,674 4,731 4,738 2,380 2,381 728 668
R-squared 0.223 0.480 0.241 0.507 0.160 0.475 0.134 0.392 0.178 0.495 0.281 0.528 0.051 0.233
Notes: The variable Xap is the share of affiliate a′s total sales shipped to the parent; Xac is the share of affiliate a′s total sales shipped to all affiliated parties; Xpa is the share
of shipments from the parent in affiliate a′s input cost; and Xcc is the share of corporation c′s total sales shipped within its boundaries. The operator D(X) is equal to 1 if
X > 0 and 0 otherwise. empa, empp, and empc are the employment in the affiliate, parent, and the aggregate employment of the multinational corporation, respectively.
Nc is the number of foreign affiliates of the corporation. Robust standard errors, clustered by MNC, are in parentheses. Levels of significance are denoted ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 3: I-O links, FDI activity, and intra-MNC trade.
D(Nxzd) log(Nxzd) D(Xap) log(Xap) D(Xpa) log(Xpa)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
drxz 0.338
∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.135
(0.015) (0.215) (0.227)
drzx 0.296
∗∗∗ 0.313 −0.170
(0.015) (0.197) (0.212)
log(drxz) 0.093
∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.059
(0.023) (0.042) (0.075)
log(drzx) 0.136
∗∗∗ 0.039 −0.019
(0.030) (0.030) (0.059)
Aff ind-ctry FE Yes Yes No No No No No No No No
Aff industry FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Aff country FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MNC FE No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 616,616 1,922 4,901 4,901 2,072 2,072 4,901 4,901 2,201 2,201
R-squared 0.055 0.716 0.177 0.442 0.238 0.506 0.153 0.480 0.253 0.528
Notes: The operator D(X) is equal to 1 if X > 0 and 0 otherwise. Nxzc refers to the number of affiliates operating
in industry x in country d owned by parents in industry z. Xap is the share of affiliate a′s total sales shipped to the
parent p. Xpa is the share of affiliate a′s total input costs shipped from the parent p. drxz is the direct requirements
coefficient from the affiliate’s primary industry into the production of the parent’s primary industry. drzx is the direct
requirements coefficient from the parent’s industry into the production of the affiliate’s industry. Our sample contains
104 host countries and 77× 77 possible industry pairs, for a total of 616,616 possible combinations, of which only 2, 523
display any multinational activity, measured as the existence of at least one affiliate. For columns 3–10, robust standard
errors, clustered by MNC, are in parentheses. In columns 1–2, standard errors are clustered by affiliate industry-country.
Levels of significance are denoted ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1.
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Table 4: Robustness.
D(Xap) log(Xap) D(Xpa) log(Xpa)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
drxz −0.306
(0.190)
I(x = z) 0.089∗∗ 0.856 0.107∗∗ 0.167
(0.037) (0.589) (0.048) (0.512)
drxz × I(x = z) −0.249
(0.339)
vap −6.3e−07∗∗∗
(2.14e−07)
log(drxz) −0.070
(0.058)
log(drxz)× I(x = z) 0.171
(0.187)
log(vap) 0.051
(0.059)
drzx 0.389
(0.297)
drzx × I(x = z) −0.733
(0.526)
vpa −0.019
(0.035)
log(drzx) 0.0632
(0.039)
log(drzx)× I(x = z) 0.152
(0.141)
log(vpa) 0.025
(0.028)
Aff industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Aff country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,901 2,951 2,072 1,257 4,901 2,951 2,201 1,395
R-squared 0.180 0.187 0.240 0.252 0.156 0.165 0.255 0.303
Notes: The operator D(X) is equal to 1 if X > 0 and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable Xap is the share of affiliate a’s total
sales shipped to the parent, and Xpa is shipments from the parent as a share of affiliate a’s cost of goods sold. drxz is the direct
requirements coefficient from the affiliate’s primary industry into the production of the parent’s primary industry. drzx is the direct
requirements coefficient from the parent’s primary industry into the production of the affiliate’s primary industry. I(x = z) is a
dummy equal to one if the parent and the affiliate operate in the same primary industry. vap and vpa are defined in (7). Robust
standard errors, clustered by MNC, are in parentheses. Levels of significance are denoted ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, and ∗p < 0.1.
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